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We present a study of the network of relationships among elected members of the Finnish parlia-
ment, based on a quantitative analysis of initiative co-signatures, and its evolution over 16 years.
To understand the structure of the parliament, we constructed a statistically validated network of
members, based on the similarity between the patterns of initiatives they signed. We looked for
communities within the network and characterized them in terms of members’ attributes, such as
electoral district and party. To gain insight on the nested structure of communities, we constructed
a hierarchical tree of members from the correlation matrix. Afterwards, we studied parliament
dynamics yearly, with a focus on correlations within and between parties, by also distinguishing
between government and opposition. Finally, we investigated the role played by specific individuals,
at a local level. In particular, whether they act as proponents who gather consensus, or as sign-
ers. Our results provide a quantitative background to current theories in political science. From
a methodological point of view, our network approach has proven able to highlight both local and
global features of a complex social system.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.Ef
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal papers by Watts and Strogatz [1],
Barabasi and Albert [2], and Newman, Watts and Stro-
gatz [3], the use of networks to describe the structure
and evolution of complex social systems has become a
standard approach in the scientific literature. Emergent
structures have been studied in social networks [4] as well
as their evolution [5, 6].
Political systems such as the European parliaments
and the US congress represent a class of social systems.
The structure of similarity of the US congress has been
investigated by using network theory methodologies in
[7], where the authors built a hierarchical tree of congress
members based on law initiatives they cosponsored and
attempted to characterize the two biggest communities
found in terms of parties (Republicans and Democrats),
by using the concept of modularity.
Although being placed in this framework, our work
focuses on a typical European parliament, it takes into
account more than one kind of initiatives (legislative and
budget ones), and quantitatively addresses the problem
of noise in a dense network, as well as the statistical
significance of attributes, such as party or district, which
characterize communities [8] in the network.
The political system under scrutiny is the Finnish par-
liament, which is a typical parliamentary system among
its peers in Europe. In addition to the government, the
∗ elena.puccio@unipa.it
parliament also has the right to initiate legislation. The
thousands of private initiatives by members of the par-
liament have a primary signer, however, they are rather
often supported by a multitude of co-signers, thus form-
ing a network of co-sponsorships. We are interested in
studying the network of these relationships among par-
liament members and the evolution of its structure over
the years.
Our goal is to gain a quantitative understanding of the
system by observing it with different techniques and by
following the dynamics of its structure over time. In or-
der to do so, we take a network approach to discover the
internal ordering of the system in communities and to
characterize them, and perform a correlation analysis of
members, in order to study the hierarchical structure of
communities [9–11] and investigate its evolution. Specifi-
cally, we study how correlations inside each party and be-
tween parties, as well as within and between government
and opposition, vary over time, by using the Frobenius
distance to measure how similar each year of a parliament
term is to the next one.
We look at the database of initiatives as a bipartite
network in which there are two sets of nodes—parliament
members on the one side, and initiatives on the other—
where a parliament member is linked to an initiative if
she/he signed it. According to that description, two par-
liament members would show a “similar” profile if they
had signed “several” initiatives together. To provide a
quantitative meaning to the expressions “similar” and
“several”, recently, a method for filtering out statistically
significant links in bipartite networks has been proposed
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2[12]. This approach has already been used to investi-
gate the structure of several systems, including stock re-
turns [15] and investors’ activity [16] in a financial mar-
ket, the specializations of criminal activity [17], the inter-
bank market [18, 19], a mobile communication network
[20], and a large survey on aging [21].
Our results indicate that the methodologies we employ
are able to single out both local and global characteris-
tics of a social system such as a parliament, which appear
consistent with pre-existent theories in political science.
Although our conclusions pertain to the Finnish legisla-
ture, the techniques we used are exportable to any similar
systems, paying due attention to any necessary adjust-
ments when carrying them over to a different political
context.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II we
introduce datasets along with their statistics, in Section
III we discuss network construction, community detec-
tion and their characterization, in Section IV we analyze
correlation matrices and hierarchical trees, with a special
focus on the last two terms, in Section V we present a
study of the dynamics of the system, year by year, in
Section VI we present results on the internal structure
of the network and finally, in the Conclusions we sum up
the results and point towards possible applications of our
methods.
II. DATA
The database consists of Finnish initiatives, submit-
ted between 1999 and 2014 by members of the parlia-
ment. The information stored in the database comprises
who submitted each initiative, who signed it and the
year it was submitted, along with the following general
attributes regarding members: their gender, party and
electoral district of origin.
Since a parliament term lasts four years, our data en-
compasses four different parliaments: Dataset I corre-
sponds to the 1999-2002 parliament, Dataset II to 2003-
2006, Dataset III to 2007-2010 and Dataset IV to 2011-
2014. Summary statistics for each dataset are shown in
TABLE I. See the Appendix for Tables of political par-
ties with their abbreviations and number of MPs, and for
the electoral districts.
According to [22], the parliament members have the
right to introduce a legislative initiative containing a pro-
posal for the enactment of an Act. As the final decision
in the State’s annual budget lies in the hands of the par-
liament, parliament members can also propose a budget
amendment containing a proposal for an appropriation
to be included in the budget or for other budgetary deci-
sion. In addition, the parliament members can propose a
petitionary motion containing a proposal for the govern-
ment for drafting a law or for taking other governmental
measures. Finally, a parliament member may propose to
the Speaker’s Council that a topical debate be held in a
plenary session. All the initiatives have to be in writing
Dataset summary statistics
parliament I II III IV
N 2,467 3,163 3,143 1,808
Hi 2-144 2-175 2-136 2-150
M 179 186 183 199
Hm 2-445 4-524 2-696 2-793
TABLE I: Summary statistics of data for each
parliament: N is the number of initiatives signed by at
least 2 members, Hi is the heterogeneity of initiatives,
that is, the range (min-max) of signatures initiatives
receive , M is the number of members who signed at
least 2 initiatives, Hm is the heterogeneity of members,
that is, the range of signatures members affix
(min-max).
and must be signed together with possible co-signatures
before the introduction. Among its peers Finland be-
longs to the more liberal parliaments in what comes to
the parliament members’ private initiative introduction
and there are very few restrictions regarding this activity
[23].
The Finnish election system is proportional with open
candidate lists. The country is divided into 15 electoral
districts. The southern and more densely populated dis-
tricts are geographically smaller than the northern ones.
For example, the geographically small (capitol) Helsinki
district has many more parliament members compared
to the very large northern Lapland district. Finland is a
parliamentary system having eight political parties rep-
resented in the parliament. During 1999-2010 two out
of the three largest parties formed a majority coalition
together with certain small party groups while the third
large party became the main the opposition party. Gen-
eral elections in 2011 changed the number of large par-
ties into four. The three largest parties formed a major-
ity coalition leaving the fourth party into opposition to-
gether with the smaller parties. The cabinet (majority)
coalition governs while the opposition has very limited
power.
III. NETWORK DESCRIPTION
In this section we construct statistically validated net-
works (SVNs) of parliament members which point to-
wards the presence of preferential relationships within
each parliament. After having revealed the informative
structure of the parliament system, we detect members’
communities and find out whether these can be charac-
terized by attributes such as party, region, and gender.
The aim is to identify the key features that drive the
formation of communities made of parliament members.
3A. Network construction
Our system is a bipartite network, consisting of parlia-
ment members on the one side and initiatives they either
proposed or signed on the other. Henceforth we treat
first signers, that is, those who initially propose the ini-
tiative, simply as signers. When dealing with bipartite
networks, one can obtain a network made of nodes of
the same type by projecting on the corresponding set of
nodes. In our case, by projecting on the parliament mem-
bers set, we obtain a network made of connections (links)
between members (nodes). The projection establishes a
link between each pair of members who sign the same ini-
tiative. Unfortunately, it’s reknown that such projection
often produces a highly connected network, due to the
heterogeneity inherent in both sets. This hides the most
informative structure of the system and therefore we ap-
ply the validation method developed in [12]. Ultimately,
this resolves the validated and informative links from the
random ones. In our system, the density of links, defined
as the fraction of links actually present in the nework m
out of the maximum number of possible links between M
nodes, D = 2 mM (M−1) , ranges between 0.93 and 0.99.
Before projecting on the members’ set, the heterogene-
ity of the initiatives’ set needs to be given due consider-
ation. Indeed, initiatives display a number of signatures
ranging from just a few (low degree), up to three quar-
ters of the parliament (high degree). To account for this
effect, we follow Ref. [12] and divide initiatives in bins Bk
according to their degree, so that each subset of the bi-
partite network now comprises initiatives with a specific
degree range dimin-d
i
max (which highly reduces hetero-
geneity on the initiatives’ side), and only those members
who actually signed them. Considering a range of degrees
proves necessary for higher degrees, to keep statistical
resolution high in the resulting bins. We set the binning
intervals equal for all four datasets, assuming that the
final results do not strongly depend on the choice made.
The set of bins is defined B1 = {2}, B2 = {3}, B3 =
{4}, B4 = {5}, B5 = {6}, B6 = {7}, B7 = {8}, B8 =
{9}, B9 = {10}, B10 = {11− 13}, B11 = {14− 20}, B12 =
{21− 40}, B13 = {41− 100}, B14 = {> 100}.
If we now consider a pair of members (i, j) in bin Bk
and each signed respectively nki and n
k
j initiatives, out
of the total number Nk of initiatives within the bin, we
expect to find a number X of initiatives they co-signed,
purely at random, that follows the hypergeometric dis-
tribution
H(X|Nk, nki , nkj ) =
(
nki
X
)(Nk−nki
nkj−X
)
(
Nk
nkj
) . (1)
It’s straightforward then to assign a p-value to the link
between i and j within the bin, under the hypergeometric
distribution null hypothesis
pkij = 1−
nkij−1∑
X=0
(
nki
X
)(Nk−nki
nkj−X
)
(
Nk
nkj
) , (2)
where nkij is the number of initiatives i and j co-signed,
in Bk. This represents the probability of randomly ob-
taining a value equal to or greater than what was actu-
ally observed, nkij . The univariate significance level of
the test, or threshold value, is usually set at either 5%
or 1%. In our case, we perform multiple tests, by vali-
dating the full set of links over all bins simultaneously.
For this very reason, we need to cotrol for false posi-
tives, or familywise error rate, by introducing a multiple
test corrected threshold. The most conservative choice,
in terms of type I errors, is applying Bonferroni correc-
tion [13, 14] αB = α/m, where m is the total number
of tests performed. From here on, we choose a univari-
ate threshold of 1% significativity and validate each link
(i, j) if pkij < αB , that is, if the p-value associated with
the link is smaller than 0.01m , according to the Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons.
The last step is obtaining the weighted network. In
fact, a link between the same pair of members could be
validated over different bins. We account for this effect
by assigning a weight to each link equal to the number
of bins the link was validated in. Since we aim at build-
ing a validated network (Bonferroni network hereafter),
members who signed less than 2 initiatives, as well as
initiatives with less than 2 signatures, have no relevance
to our analysis and have thus been omitted. The Bon-
ferroni network’s general statistics are shown in TABLE
II, along with some properties of the full network, that
show the advantage accorded by this filtering method.
Basically, we’re interested in studying how members
cluster together on the basis of the initiatives they co-
sign, thus the null hypothesis and validation allow us to
distinguish information from noise.
B. Community detection
After building the network, our main interest lies in
finding out whether it’s internally organized in commu-
nities, and ultimately, which attributes, the additional
information on members, characterize each community.
Notoriously, partitioning a network is neither straight-
forward nor simple, there are a variety of algorithms that
attempt to do so, each with its benefits and shortcom-
ings [24]. Nonetheless, the majority of techniques relies
on the concept of modularity [25, 26]:
Q =
1
2m
∑
ij
(
Aij − kikj
2m
)
δ(Ci, Cj), (3)
wherem is the total number of links in the network, Aij is
the adjacency matrix, (ki, kj) are node i’s and j’s degrees,
4Bonferroni Network statistics
I II III IV
MB 172 177 161 153
mB 1633 1839 1162 1811
f 10.4% 10.9% 7.2% 9.9%
µ(w) 4.1 ± 2.0 3.6 ± 1.9 3.3 ± 1.9 2.9 ± 1.5
µ(wB) 1.4 ± 0.8 1.4 ± 0.7 1.6 ± 1.0 1.3 ± 0.7
wm-wM 1-8 1-6 1-9 1-8
TABLE II: Bonferroni network statistics for parliament
terms I − IV . The number of members involved in the
validated network MB , the number of validated links
mB , the percentage of validated links f out of the total
number of original links, the mean weight µ(w) of the
original network links and its s.d., the mean weight of
validated links µ(wB) along with its s.d., and links’
weight range wm-wM in the Bonferroni Network.
Modularity and mutual information
I II III IV
Q 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.53
µ(MI) 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.90
TABLE III: Modularity for the best partition Q and
overall mean of the mutual information between the
best partition and each of the other 5 partitions, µ(MI).
the sum is carried out over all the nodes and the delta
function returns 0 if i’s and j’s communities are different
Ci 6= Cj and 1 otherwise. The goal of every algorithm
is to maximize the modularity over all partitions found,
iteratively.
In our case, we chose a community detection software
Radatools [27], which employs a combination of differ-
ent algorithms [28–31], allows for weighted networks and
multiple repetitions of each algorithm, thus producing
high modularities. We tried different combinations of al-
gorithms, run one after the other in cascade, as detailed
in the software’s manual [? ]
For each cascade, we ran several repetitions and usu-
ally had the best results by using 200 repetitions of (vi)
e b r f b r. Furthermore, in order to check the stability of
our best partition, we evaluated the similarity between
the former and each of the other partitions found with
the various cascades, by using the mutual information
(MI) [32, 33]. As TABLE III indicates, we found a high
mean similarity, which shows a good stability of the best
partition, regardless of the algorithm cascade chosen.
C. Characterization of communities
After finding a stable partition of the system, we look
for each community’s characterizing attributes, by vali-
FIG. 1: Qualitative illustration of communities. For full
information, see TABLES IV-VIII in the Appendix.
Top row with 7 communities is the I parliament term
(green), II term has 9 communities (blue), III has 9
(cyan) and IV has 4 (red). A dotted pattern indicates
characterization by party, a striped pattern
characterization by district, the presence of both
patterns indicates characterization by both. The radius
of each circle is proportional to the number of members
within the community. For example, parliament II in
the second row has a large number of modest size
communities where all except one has district
characterization. In contrast, for parliament IV (fourth
line), the number of communities is limited but their
size is large, with only one community characterized by
district whilst party drives community formation.
dating any additional information on members contained
in the database. This is accomplished in a similar fash-
ion as what done in Section III A when validating links,
following the method in [8]. The method makes use of
the hypergeometric distribution to assess the probability
that a given attribute is over-expressed in the elements of
a community in respect to all the elements of the investi-
gated set. Again, each attribute is validated, community-
wise, if the associated p-value falls below the Bonferroni
threshold at 1% of significativity.
The attributes we consider are both specific, such as a
member’s party, district and gender, and more generic, as
whether the district was in a rural or metropolitan area
(Helsinki and Uusimaa), whether the party was in the
government or in the opposition and its political position
(right, centre or left).
Overall, we found a satisfactory characterization of
communities by party, district or both, as shown in Fig. 1,
and some characterization by area, coalition and politi-
cal position (details in the appendix, TABLES VI - XII).
Surprisingly, gender doesn’t appear characterizing, indi-
cating there is no influence of a member’s gender over
whom he collaborates with.
Still, the most interesting result is that, although party
5appears more explanatory for the first dataset, show-
ing up in all communities, both party and district con-
cur to characterize communities in the second and third
datasets, with district growing in importance. Finally,
party reverts to being the most characterizing attribute
for the last dataset.
Indeed, it appears that collaboration moved from be-
ing among members of the same party to being among
members from the same district, as time passed by, with
the last parliament going against the trend. The Bonfer-
roni Network for the third parliament is shown in Fig. 2,
this is the best example of districts playing a major role
in how members cooperate. Broadly speaking, the power
of our method lies in that it allows us to quantitatively
characterize communities in the network and is further
able to reveal changes occurring in the structure of the
collaboration web among members, from term to term.
IV. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate the structure of the cor-
relation matrix with the aim of building a hierarchical
tree of members. The advantage that the correlation ma-
trix offers over the network approach, is the hierarchical
ordering of members. This allows to look for substructure
within each cluster. The drawback is that we no longer
use a quantitative tool to discriminate the random part
of correlations present in the system.
The first step to obtain a correlation matrix between
members, is to define a correlation coefficient, that hinges
on the similarity between patterns of signatures. Specif-
ically, we’d like to evaluate the similarity between a
pair of members (i, j) by using a correlation coefficient
si,j ∈ [−1, 1] [34] that takes into account the number
of joint signatures (nij), the number of individual sig-
natures (ni, nj) and the total number of initiatives (M).
Basically, when considering binary vectors, that is, vec-
tors whose entries can be either 1 or 0, this turns out
to be just a straightforward derivation of the Pearson
correlation coefficient
si,j =
nij − ninj/M√
ni(1− ni/M)nj(1− nj/M)
. (4)
A. Hierarchical trees
Hierarchical trees are built by using the average linkage
method, that is, by successively merging pairs of clusters
A and B according to a mean distance between elements
x ∈ A and y ∈ B given by
µ(dx,y) =
1
|A| · |B|
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B
dx,y, (5)
where |A| and |B| indicate the number of elements be-
longing to cluster A and B, respectively. The quantity
FIG. 2: Bonferroni Network for the III parliament. The
map in red lines shows electoral districts in Finland,
node shapes indicate each member’s party:
hexagon=KD, diamond=KESK, ellipse=KOK,
rectangle=PS, V=RKP, parallelogram=SDP,
triangle=VAS, octagon=VIHR. Nodes are located
either on the map, according to their district of origin
or outside the map, when party characterization
dominates (the network reflects what shown in Fig. 1,
3rd row). To emphasize the network partition, links
within each community are displayed in black, links
between communities are in light gray. All communities
are well characterized by district, with the exception of
parties VAS and SDP, on the left-hand side.
dx,y is a measure of distance between members x and
y [10], which is a function of the correlation coefficient
given in Eq. (4):
dx,y =
√
2 (1− sx,y). (6)
By looking at all trees, we again find that both parties
and districts play a role in how members cluster together,
within each parliament term. Such a strong characteri-
zation by party, district and coalition gives an insight on
what actually determines members affiliation to a specific
cluster.
The main result lies in the hierarchical structure re-
vealed by this method: the opposition tends to cluster
strongly by party, while the government shows a collabo-
ration among parties and a further subclustering by dis-
trict. We chose to display figures just for the last two
6terms, where the change in the system’s structure is more
striking, see Figs. 3 and 4.
Political position doesn’t appear to be crucial, in gen-
eral left-wing parties are somewhat closer together. On
the other hand, coalition plays a major role, with gov-
ernment and opposition parties neatly separated. Specifi-
cally, opposition parties show closed ranks, while the gov-
ernment cluster doesn’t show much of a party structure.
Finally, some districts seem to work together, in particu-
lar, the metropolitan ones of Uusimaa and Helsinki. This
behaviour is common to the first three parliaments, see
Fig. 3 for the hierarchical tree of the third term. An
exception to this overall behaviour is represented by the
last term, where we found the government coalition clus-
tering mainly by party against the trend of the previous
years, as shown in Fig. 4.
B. Structure of the correlation matrix
In this section, we focus on the correlation matrices for
the last two parliaments (see Fig. 5), where the subclus-
ters are easily seen, along with the change of structure
from one term to the next. Members are arranged accord-
ing to the hierarchical trees in the previous subsection.
Apparently, during the III term there’s a higher overall
correlation and small district-clusters in the government,
along with 4 bigger party-clusters in the opposition. On
the other hand, during the last term, a collaborative gov-
ernment is clearly seen as a yellow huge cluster with a left
and right subdivision and some party-subclusters. For
the opposition, there are now only 2 very compact par-
ties, who slightly collaborate with the government and
anti-correlate with each other.
By comparing the general structure of the correla-
tion matrices, we draw the conclusion that party counts
more than district during the last parliament and op-
position parties make a statement of behaving in op-
posite ways, which is noticeably different than previous
terms. Our approch is thus able to detect the change
that occurs in the system’s structure when the parlia-
ment changes, and to quantitatively assess the different
webs of collaboration/anti-collaboration that arise within
it.
V. SOME DYNAMICAL FEATURES WITHIN
AND OVER THE PARLIAMENTARY TERMS
We focus now on more detailed look on the dynamical
features, in particular by looking at the annual evolution
of the correlation matrix. Correlation matrices are hence-
forth computed year by year, and arranged in blocks rep-
resenting parties, in order to have a closer look at how
interactions evolve within each party (diagonal blocks)
and between them (off-diagonal blocks).
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FIG. 3: Clustering of members during the III
parliament term. On the left, leaves and branches are
colored according to parties, circle-shaped leaves
indicate nodes in the government (top half of the tree),
while triangles indicate nodes in the opposition (bottom
half). Coloring on the right-side tree is according to
district. The x-axis shows correlation values, going from
0 (no correlation) to 1 (maximum correlation), the
spacing is not linear due to the measure of distance
chosen. Party dominates in the opposition, while
district sub-clustering occurs in the government.
7Clusters by party, 2011−2014
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FIG. 4: Clustering of members during the IV
parliament term. On the left, leaves and branches are
colored according to parties, circle-shaped leaves
indicate nodes in the government (top half of the tree),
while triangles indicate nodes in the opposition (bottom
half). Coloring on the right-side tree is according to
district. The x-axis shows correlation values, going from
0 (no correlation) to 1 (maximum correlation), the
spacing is not linear due to the measure of distance
chosen. Here party dominates strongly both in the
opposition and in the government, with sporadic
subclustering by district. Noticeably, the two opposition
parties do not cluster together.
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FIG. 5: Correlation matrices of members for III (top
panel) and IV (bottom panel) parliament terms. The
color key displays negative correlations in red, near-zero
values in orange, mild correlations in yellow and high
correlations in green. Colored bars on the side indicate
either members’ party (left bar) or district (top bar), as
displayed by side legends. In each matrix, members are
ordered according to each term’s correponding
hierarchical tree. In the III term, district sublclustering
(colored bar on top) can be clearly discerned within the
government (top-right square), from left to right: hame,
esav, vaas, vars, sata, psav, keski, the metropolitan
districts of uusi and hels, lapp and pirk. Party
clustering is present in the opposition (bottom-left 4
green clusters corresponding to parties: ps, vas, sdp and
kd). In the IV term, we find party subclustering within
the government (top-right square), with right-wing
parties at the top and left-wing parties at the bottom.
The 2 opposition parties (ps and kesk) are on the
lower-left corner and anti-correlate with each other.
Here we notice how district subclustering almost
disappears.
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FIG. 6: Mean correlation between parties, over time.
Panel a) Inter-party mean correlation between KD and
all the others; b) KESK-others; c) KOK-others; d)
PS-others; e) RKP-others; f) SDP-others; g)
VAS-others; h) VIHR-others. Red horizontal lines mark
the 0-value. Vertical lines separate parliament terms.
The general trend shows higher inter-party mean
correlation during I term, decreasing, packed together,
going below zero, mean correlation values during II and
III term and increasing, broader values during last term
(with the sole exception of the 2 opposition parties).
A. Mean correlations
We are interested in how correlations within each party
and among parties evolve year by year. The purpose here
is obtaining a closer look at the dynamics of interactions
between members depending on the party they belong
to. We consider the mean correlation calculated over
members belonging to a specific party (intra-party), and
the mean correlation calculated between members of that
party and each of the others (inter-party).
From Fig. 6 and 7, we can see how each party presents
its own pattern of collaboration with every other party,
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FIG. 7: Mean correlation within each party, over time.
Panel a) Intra-party mean correlation for party KD; b)
KESK; c) KOK; d) PS; e) RKP; f) SDP; g) VAS; h)
VIHR. Vertical lines help distinguishing each
parliament term. In general, the trend indicates that
when parties are at the government (shown in green)
they have lower mean correlation than when at the
opposition (shown in red). In any case, intra-party
mean correlation values are on average higher than
inter-party ones, as expected. Error bars are 6 standard
deviations of the mean.
which is not constant over the years, not even within a
single parliament term. Nonetheless, there are some gen-
eral trends, for example it’s apparent how the first and
even more so the last term are unusual in the sense of
having spread out of correlations, while second and third
terms (in the middle) display a narrower, more similar
pattern. Moreover, mean inter-party correlation tend to
be positive during the I term, still positive but closer to
zero during the II, they turn slightly negative for opposi-
tion parties during the III (kd, ps, sdp, vas) and plunge
even more for opposition parties during last term (kesk,
ps). Error bars were calculated by bootstrapping data
1000 times and choosing 5-95% confidence intervals, and
are all of the order of 10−2.
The overall mean correlation between a party and all
the others, all parliaments considered, is strictly posi-
tive, ranging from 0.06 to 0.12. So, on average, ps is
the least collaborative, while kok, sdp and vihr seem the
most willing to collaborate, as expected from parties of-
ten at the government. Therefore, we can see the be-
havioural change of parties, especially in correspondance
to a change of parliament.
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FIG. 8: Panel a): Mean intra-party correlation for
government parties (green squares), and for opposition
parties (red circles), over time. Opposition parties
display a higher mean correlation throughout the
parliament terms. Panel b): mean inter-party
correlation between all government parties (green
squares), between all opposition parties (red circles)
and between government and opposition parties (black
triangles), over time. Here correlations between
government parties become noticeably higher over time
than those between government and opposition, which
still best those between opposition parties. The 3 curves
tend to spread out over time, and again collaboration
between government parties is high, whilst that between
opposition parties grows scarcer and scarcer. Error bars
are 6 standard deviations of the mean. Vertical lines
separate terms, and the 0-value is clearly indicated.
To get a closer look at how correlations vary within
government and opposition coalitions, we repeated the
whole analysis by grouping parties according to their
coalition. Our main finding is that mean correlation
tends to be higher within parties in the opposition than
parties in the government, while collaboration is higher
between parties in the government than between those in
the opposition, as expected (see Fig. 8). Collaboration
between government and opposition is low, but still bet-
ter than collaboration within the opposition, which be-
comes negative by the end of the second parliament, stays
slightly negative during the III and takes a dive during
the fourth. When looking at mean inter-party correla-
tion we also notice how the trend is for the 3 curves to
spread out over time.
In order to stress how high values of the mean correla-
tion within the opposition do not reflect a collaboration
between parties, we also looked at the distribution of cor-
relations within the opposition. What we found is that
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FIG. 9: Distribution of correlations between members
of opposition parties. Panel a) I parliament; b) II
parliament; c) III parliament; d) IV parliament. The
shaded area (in blue) represents correlations within
each party, the rest are correlations between opposition
parties. All distributions are two-peaked, showing how
collaboration is strong within each party (right peak),
but weak between different opposition parties (left
peak), this feature grows stronger from term to term
and is enhanced during the last one.
these high values within the opposition are only due to
high intra-party correlations, but do not point towards a
strong collaboration between parties, as shown in Fig. 9.
In fact, the distribution of correlations is not homoge-
neous, but displays 2 peaks. By coloring the area due to
intra-party correlations, we can explicitly see how indeed
these fall on the high side (right peak), while correlations
between opposition parties (left peak) center on near-zero
values for the first 3 terms and turn negative during the
last term.
On the other hand, if we look at the distribution of cor-
relations within the government, we find that it is rather
homogeneous, which is an indication of how government
parties present more of a united stance.
B. Annual distance within each parliament
In this section we study the Frobenius distance be-
tween the correlation matrices of members correspond-
ing to the 4 different years composing each parliament.
We aim to understand whether there are similar years
within a parliament term and unusual ones, in terms of
how members cooperate as expressed by the correlation
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FIG. 10: Frobenius distance between correlation
matrices corresponding to a year and the one
immediately after, within each parliament. Different
symbols indicate different parliaments, separeted by
vertical black lines: squares for the I term, circles for the
II, triangles for the III and diamonds for the last one.
matrix relative to each year.
The Frobenius distance between two matrices Σ1 and
Σ2 is defined as:
F (Σ1,Σ2) =
√
Tr[(Σ1 − Σ2)(Σ1 − Σ2)T ] (7)
In order to compare two matrices using this measure,
their dimension must be the same. For this reason, we
restricted the analysis to members who signed at least 1
initiative per year (and thus are active every year).
The results are shown in Fig. 10 for all terms, although
it should be borne in mind that it’s not possible to com-
pare parliaments, because the corresponding correlation
matrices involve different members, are in general of dif-
ferent dimensions, and the Frobenius distance depends
on the dimension of the matrices involved.
From Fig. 10, we can see an initial stabilising trend,
followed by a diverging one. Indeed, for the first term, the
most anomalous year is the first, when the parliament has
just formed, while the last 2 years are the most similar.
The second term is in a sort of stable equilibrium, while
for the last two terms, the trend is diverging, with the
3rd and 4th years most dissimilar and the first two being
more or less alike.
VI. INTERNAL STRUCTURE: RECIPROCITY
AND DISPARITY
We turn our attention now on individual parliament
members. Specifically, we are looking for special nodes,
as for example members of relevance for their own party
(local leaders), or members who gain favour from many
others (influential people), as well as members who
mostly sign other’s initiatives (followers).
A. Reciprocity
A feature of our social system we’re interested in is
reciprocity, or in other words the tendency of a member
to reciprocate a signature he received.
As a measure of reciprocity between two people, we
suggest the following:
ri,j =
ni→j − nj→i
ni→j + nj→i
, i < j
where ni→j stands for the number of signatures by i on
initiatives proposed by j and nj→i is vice-versa. The two
extreme categories are the one with r = 0, implying full
reciprocity, and the one with r = ±1, implying unrecip-
rocation of signatures (either from i to j or from j to i).
Interestingly, most members fall in these two categories,
meaning that either they fully reciprocate all signatures
they receive (r = 0), or they just gain signatures from
others without ever once returning them (r = ±1).
In our data we can single out a few members in each
term who receive an outstanding amount of signatures
(from several hundreds, to a few thousands) from all the
others, that they do not reciprocate. The Table VIII in
the Appendix shows the top three scores of reciprocity.
B. Disparity
An interesting feature of the internal structure of our
network is, more in general, the presence of net givers and
net receivers of signatures. We introduced four centrality
measures, that aim to weigh the tendency of a member
to sign others’ initiatives against his tendency to receive
signatures. Basically, we’re introducing “disparity” mea-
sures of out-degree/in-degree imbalance in our bipartite
network.
The measures we consider take into account the num-
ber of initiatives proposed and signed by member i, the
number of signatures member i received, the number of
different members who signed i’s initiatives and the num-
ber of different members whose initiatives i signed. Un-
fortunately, given the several dimensions of heterogene-
ity involved, there is no unique way to calculate out-
degree/in-degree imbalance for our system.
The first measure we consider is the number of initia-
tives np proposed by member i minus the total number
of initiatives i signed, ns, normalized to the sum:
d1 =
np − ns
np + ns
.
If d1 is positive, it indicates that member i tends to pro-
pose more initiatives than he signs: he’s more focused on
submitting proposals than on signing any.
The second measure is the number of signatures i re-
ceived on average per initiative proposed nr/np, minus
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the number of initiatives i signed, normalized to the sum:
d2 =
nr/np − ns
nr/np + ns
.
If d2 is positive, it means that member i receives more
signatures per initiative than he affixes. Whoever scores
high here, proposed just a few very successful initiatives,
without signing many initiatives proposed by others.
The third measure is the absolute number nr of signa-
tures i received minus the number of initiatives i signed,
normalized to the sum:
d3 =
nr − ns
nr + ns
.
A positive value of d3 implies a member is a net receiver
overall, regardless of the number of initiatives he pro-
posed.
The last measure is a bit different from the previous
three in that it focuses on members instead of signatures.
It counts the number of different members mr who signed
i’s initiatives minus the number of different members ms
whose initiatives i signed, normalized to the sum:
d4 =
mr −ms
mr +ms
.
This measure, d4, is a direct proxy of whether a member
i has a wide network of collaboration: a high (low) score
here indicates a member is a global receiver (signer), link-
ing members from different clusters.
Tables XIII and XIV in the Appendix show the top and
worst scores, respectively, for all these measures. Looking
at who comes out on top, in terms of the number of
unreciprocated signatures received and the scores on the
four disparity measures, and considering also the lowest
scores, we get the following picture, consistent over all
terms: there are few highly active members who rank
top, the leaders, and a bulk of members who rank low
and are mainly signers (followers).
Opposition parties are the most active, directing ini-
tiatives through one or two selected members who are
not party leaders, but often are veterans or chairmen,
while the rest of the party, the signers, simply sign their
initiatives. This is easily seen by looking at the max-
imum number of unreciprocated signatures received, at
measures d1 (high number of proposals) and d3 (high ab-
solute number of signatures received), where we find the
same couple of members from opposition parties, show-
ing a huge level of activity, along with many members of
government parties who display a moderate activity.
Government parties dominate measures d2 and d4,
where the first number represents the mean number of
signatures received per proposal, while the second num-
ber measures the number of signatures by different mem-
bers. This is probably due to the way government parties
collaborate among them by both proposing and signing
each other’s initiatives, and in so doing they display a
larger area of influence.
Although the highest scores appear dominated by the
government, with just a few very active members in the
opposition, acting for their own parties, the lowest scores
are completely ruled by the opposition. The reason for
this is, as we stated, that the whole party focuses sup-
port for its spokesmen, trying its best to push their plans
through, since they can’t count on any substantial col-
laboration outside their own party.
The scenario that emerges from this analysis is one
of a government with a stronger collaboration web be-
tween parties, producing a certain number of moderately
active people who split the job of proposing and sign-
ing initiatives among themselves, widening their network
of collaborations beyond just their party. On the other
hand, opposition parties present a strong front, channel-
ing proposals through one or two members and raising
consensus within their own party.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The statistically validated network method has been
used to retrieve the informative structure of a social sys-
tem, the Finnish parliament. After reducing the density
of links in our network to the fundamental core, according
to the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, we
validate communities and find that not only party drives
the network of collaboration between members of the par-
liament, but also their district of origin. Network charac-
terization changes over time, as the parliament changes,
due to both a partial change in its components (roughly
40%-50% of members remain the same from one parlia-
ment to the next), and to an evolution of the collabo-
ration network itself. In particular, a tipping point in
this evolution is represented by the outburst of the PS
party in 2011, which determined an apparent increase of
the importance of party in characterizing communities of
members and a subsequent decrease of the role played by
the district of election.
The statistically validated network analysis does not
allow one to gain deep insight about either the behav-
ior of members who show peculiar patterns of signatures,
because they turn out to be excluded from the network
(about 10% of parliament members), or the sub-structure
of revealed communities. To gain a closer insight into
the nested structure of communities, how they emerge
and how collaboration profiles change from parliament
to parliament, we perform a correlation analysis and con-
struct hierarchical trees of parliament members based on
pairwise similarity. We show that the structure of simi-
larity of parliament members change from a term to the
next, due to the varying composition of the parliament
itself, i.e., for instance, the proportion of members be-
tween two parties change from a term to the next. How-
ever, a major change of the structure of the system oc-
curs between the third an fourth parliament. Indeed the
increased number of parliament members from the PS
party in the last term, not only changed dramatically
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the composition of the parliament at the relative weight
of the different parties, but it also polarized the behavior
of parliament members, who became less prone to coop-
eration outside of their party. Such an inter-party collab-
oration, though, is more pronounced among parties that
support the government, and such a stylized fact is persis-
tent throughout the sixteen years analyzed in the paper.
The result is that government and opposition show an
intrinsically different behavior in that within the former,
collaboration happens across party lines, with distinct
sub-clusters characterized by district of election, whilst,
within the opposition, parties close ranks and tend not to
collaborate with each other. As a result, different parties
in the opposition can even become negatively correlated,
as is the case during the last parliament. Such a behav-
ior of opposition parties is so extreme that they tend to
collaborate more with the parties that support the gov-
ernment than with each other.
The correlation analysis also shows how the parlia-
ment inner workings change, according to the Frobenius
distance between correlation matrices of one year and
the next within a single term. Specifically during the
first term we observe a negative trend of the Frobenius
distance over the years, indicating that the correlation
structure of the parliament tends to stabilize over time.
Such a stabilizing trend almost disappears in the second
parliament, where the similarity between the correlation
matrices is stable over time. In the third parliament, we
observe an inversion of the trend, and correlation matri-
ces at the end of the term are more different than those
at the beginning. Finally, such a de-stabilizing trend be-
comes very pronounced in the last parliament.
To study the system also from the perspective of single
parliament members, and to observe how their influence
changes over time, we develop ad hoc measures, and look
at parliament members as leaders, influential groups and
followers. The result is again a different behavioral pat-
tern between opposition, which channels all initiatives
through one or two leaders and a bulk of followers, and
government, which develops a wider collaboration web,
displaying a variety of influential members who split the
load between them.
To sum up, we developed and used methodologies
that prove themselves effective when studying multi-
party democracies or parliamentary systems, as are those
within the EU, especially so when there are many factors
concurring to determine a network of collaboration.
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Appendix: Tables
Parties and number of seats
I II III IV
KD 10 7 7 6
Christian Democrats (4.2%) (5.3%) (4.9%) (4.0%)
KESK 48 55 51 35
Center Party (22.4%) (24.7%) (23.1%) (15.8%)
KOK 46 40 50 44
National Coalition Party (21.0%) (18.6%) (22.3%) (20.4%)
PS 1 3 5 39
True Finns (1.0%) (1.6%) (4.1%) (19.1%)
RKP 12 9 10 10
Swedish People’s Party (5.1%) (4.6%) (4.6%) (4.3%)
SDP 51 53 45 42
Social Democratic Party (22.9%) (24.5%) (21.4%) (19.1%)
VAS 20 19 17 14
Left Alliance (10.9%) (9.9%) (8.8%) (8.1%)
VIHR 11 14 15 10
Green League (7.3%) (8.0%) (8.5%) (7.3%)
TABLE IV: Political party groups and seats for each
parliament term. The numbers in parentheses give
percentage from total number of votes.
Electoral districts and number of seats
A˚land alan 1
Etela¨-savo esav 6
Ha¨me hame 14
Helsinki hels 21
Central Finland keski 10
Kymi kymi 12
Lapland lapp 7
Oulu oulu 18
Pirkanmaa pirk 18
North Karelia pkar 6
Pohjois-Savo psav 10
Satakunta sata 9
Uusimaa uusi 34
Vaasa vaas 17
Varsinais-Suomi vars 17
TABLE V: Electoral districts, their abbreviations, and
number of seats.
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Party coalition and position
I II III IV
Gov. sdp,vas,vihr, kesk,sdp,rkp kesk,rkp,kok, sdp,vas,vihr,
kok,rkp vihr kd,kok,rkp
Opp. kesk,kd,ps kok,kd,ps, sdp,vas,kd, kesk,ps
vas, vihr ps
Right kok, kd, ps
Centre kesk, rkp
Left sdp, vas, vihr
TABLE VI: Government/Opposition coalitions for each
term and party political position.
Parliament members overlap
II III IV
I 0.575 0.374 0.173
II - 0.552 0.274
III - - 0.388
TABLE VII: Matrix showing the overlap of members
between each pair of terms, as a fraction of the
maximum possible overlap, that is, the minimum
number of members during both terms considered. This
number is not 200 because whoever signed less than 2
initiatives was not considered.
Reciprocity top 3 scores
Surname Party Signatures
Tiilikainen kesk 3,002
Ruohonen ps 1,412
Kalmari kesk 292
TABLE VIII: Reciprocity top 3 scorers. All are from
opposition parties and receive the highest number of
unreciprocated signatures.
Communities for the I parliament
NC Party District Gender Area Coalition Position
53 sdp, vas pirk - rural gov left
48 kesk - - - opp centre
23 kok uusi - metro gov right
15 - vars - - - -
12 rkp vaas - - - -
11 vihr - f - - left
10 kd - - - opp right
TABLE IX: Community characterization for the I
term. NC is the number of members in each community,
characterizing attributes are indicated on the top row.
Communities are ordered by decreasing size.
Communities for the II parliament
NC Party District Gender Area Coalition Position
40 kok - - - opp right
35 vihr uusi - metro - left
26 vas psav - - - left
25 kesk pkar, kymi - rural gov centre
18 - hame, vars - - - -
15 ps vaas - - - -
9 - pirk - - - -
5 - esav - - - -
4 - sata - - - -
TABLE X: Community characterization for the II
term. NC is the number of members in each community,
characterizing attributes are indicated on the top row.
Communities are ordered by decreasing size.
Communities for the III parliament
NC Party District Gender Area Coalition Position
37 sdp - - rural opp left
30 ps uusi - metro - -
22 rkp vaas - - - centre
20 vas - - - opp left
14 - pirk - - - -
13 - vars - - - -
12 - hame - - - -
10 - esav - - - -
3 - lapp - - - -
TABLE XI: Community characterization for the III
term. NC is the number of members in each community,
characterizing attributes are indicated on the top row.
Communities are ordered by decreasing size.
Communities for the IV parliament
NC Party District Gender Area Coalition Position
60 sdp - - - gov left
40 ps - - - opp right
40 kesk - - - opp centre
13 rkp vaas - - - -
TABLE XII: Community characterization for the IV
term. NC is the number of members in each community,
characterizing attributes are indicated on the top row.
Communities are ordered by decreasing size.
14
Disparity top 10 Scores
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d1
Tiilikainen kesk 147 40 4750 26 39 0.57
Thors rkp 22 15 31 10 4 0.19
Ruohonen ps 195 168 6174 45 51 0.07
Arhinmaki vas 3 6 30 5 11 -0.33
Nylander rkp 7 17 7 11 3 -0.42
Nylund rkp 23 59 83 21 40 -0.44
Gestrin rkp 6 17 20 13 7 -0.48
Hanninen vas 3 13 12 9 8 -0.62
Kanerva kok 9 41 102 34 26 -0.64
Eloranta sdp 9 41 136 26 75 -0.64
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d2
Harkimo kok 1 41 103 31 103 0.43
Kopra kok 1 44 101 33 101 0.39
Sarkomaa kok 1 27 56 19 56 0.35
Makela kok 4 36 256 29 133 0.28
Kymalainen sdp 2 55 188 39 135 0.26
Mantymaa kok 1 72 120 33 120 0.25
Arhinmaki vas 3 6 30 5 11 0.25
Sinnemaki vihr 2 13 39 10 34 0.20
Kataja kok 3 35 143 26 132 0.15
Lapintie vas 1 27 31 13 31 0.07
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d3
Tiilikainen kesk 147 40 4750 26 39 0.98
Ruohonen ps 195 168 6174 45 51 0.95
Makela kok 4 36 256 29 133 0.75
Arhinmaki vas 3 6 30 5 11 0.67
Satonen kok 5 50 247 31 129 0.66
Pelkonen kok 5 45 190 35 130 0.62
Kataja kok 3 35 143 26 132 0.61
Autto kok 4 57 225 39 136 0.60
Kauma kok 4 37 131 28 89 0.56
Tolvanen kok 4 52 183 32 109 0.56
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d4
Kataja kok 3 35 143 26 132 0.67
Toivakka kok 4 46 145 26 133 0.67
Makela kok 4 36 256 29 133 0.64
Satonen kok 5 50 247 31 129 0.61
Kalmari kesk 11 229 427 40 162 0.60
Kalliorinne vas 6 46 151 30 117 0.59
Pelkonen kok 5 45 190 35 130 0.58
Mantymaa kok 1 72 120 33 120 0.57
Viitamies sdp 6 65 174 33 122 0.57
Autto kok 4 57 225 39 136 0.55
TABLE XIII: Disparity top scorers for the IV term.
Opposition parties are in bold letters. The top 3 scorers
in Reciprocity, all from opposition parties, score high in
disparity measures and are written in italics.
Disparity worst 10 Scores
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d1
Puumala kesk 1 215 101 36 101 -0.99
Koskela ps 3 528 53 56 28 -0.99
Vaatainen ps 1 368 25 54 25 -0.99
Vahamaki ps 3 455 30 58 10 -0.99
Alatalo kesk 2 208 14 47 11 -0.98
Lintila kesk 2 229 35 32 34 -0.98
Lohi kesk 2 239 2 43 1 -0.98
Maijala kesk 2 205 110 48 104 -0.98
Eerola ps 4 460 143 66 76 -0.98
Virtanen ps 2 244 21 37 13 -0.98
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d2
Lohi kesk 2 239 2 43 1 -0.99
Korhonen kesk 13 226 33 47 14 -0.98
Pirttilahti kesk 27 265 79 50 23 -0.98
Torniainen kesk 18 245 34 43 11 -0.98
Hautala kesk 49 278 207 48 13 -0.97
Kaikkonen kesk 24 215 79 46 41 -0.97
Rundgren kesk 3 239 10 44 8 -0.97
Vehkapera kesk 6 223 18 43 10 -0.97
Niikko ps 31 565 296 63 38 -0.97
Yrttiaho vihr 3 56 3 39 1 -0.96
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d3
Lohi kesk 2 239 2 43 1 -0.98
Jaskari kok 1 50 1 31 1 -0.96
Peltokorpi kesk 1 71 2 5 2 -0.95
Rundgren kesk 3 239 10 44 8 -0.92
Yrttiaho vihr 3 56 3 39 1 -0.90
Vahamaki ps 3 455 30 58 10 -0.88
Alatalo kesk 2 208 14 47 11 -0.87
Vaatainen ps 1 368 25 54 25 -0.87
Tiainen vas 1 64 5 44 5 -0.86
Vehkapera kesk 6 223 18 43 10 -0.85
Surname Party np ns nr ms mr d4
Lohi kesk 2 239 2 43 1 -0.95
Yrttiaho vihr 3 56 3 39 1 -0.95
Jaskari kok 1 50 1 31 1 -0.94
Feldt sdp 2 23 2 18 1 -0.89
Ojala sdp 4 43 7 29 2 -0.87
Saarinen sdp 6 47 11 32 3 -0.83
Palm kd 7 74 28 36 4 -0.80
Tiainen vas 1 64 5 44 5 -0.80
Mustajarvi vihr 13 65 16 46 5 -0.80
Jaaskelainen kd 6 59 24 25 4 -0.72
TABLE XIV: Disparity worst 10 scorers for the IV
term. Opposition parties are in bold letters. Lowest
scores are dominated by opposition members who
mainly support their spokesmen.
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